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Organized Crime Phenomenon Threatening Public Safety
and Rule of Law in Kosovo
Fatos Haziri
Prishtina University “ Hasan Prishtina”
Abstract. Nowadays organized crime is considered as a real threat to the security of any country, but
in particular, to the security of countries with fragile democracies that do not have any strength,
tradition or experience to effectively deal with it. In this regard, for Balkans, this phenomenon is
considered as the main threat to the security of each country and the region in general and in particular
for our country Kosovo. Despite the progress achieved, the creation of institutions since 1999 had
three transitions; UNM IK period 1999-2008, the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008
and the arrival of new EULEX mission in 2009 that was made to build a new future through
integration process in the European Union, in the eyes of the international community our region is
still considered quite fragile and challenging. The events of 1990-1999 in former Yugoslavia created
great difficulties not only for the new states but also in the actual integration developments that these
countries aim not to lose the chance to refute another infamous epithet as "organized crime haven".
In this epithet may have doses of exaggeration, but the truth for these last 20 years is that, while all
kinds of industries in the region have failed, there is a thriving new "industry", working day and night
in full capacity: industry of organized crime.
Keywords: What is organized crime? What are the sources? Where is more widespread in the
Western Balkans? How can you fight against organized crime? Which are investigative techniques?

1. Introduction
In modern time, organized crime is considered as a real threat to the security of any country, but in
particular, for the safety of countries with fragile democracies, that have no tradition or appropriate
experience to deal effectively with it. In this respect, in Balkans, this phenomenon is considered as
the main threat to the security of each country and generally for the entire region and in particular for
our country, Kosovo.
Despite the progress achieved: the process of the creation of institutions since 1999 during which
process we had three transitions, that of UNM IK period from 1999 to 2008, declaring the
independence on February 17, 2008 and the arrival of new EULEX mission in 2009 that was made to
build a new future through integration process in the European Union, in the eyes of the international
community our region is still valued highly fragile and challenging.
The events during the years 1990-1999 in the former Yugoslavia created great difficulties not only
for the new states but also in current integrating developments, in which these countries intend not to
lose a chance to deny another infamous epithet, as "organized crime haven". In this epithet may have
doses of exaggeration, but the truth for these last 20 years is that, while all kinds of industries in the
region have gone bankrupt, has flourished a "new industry", working day and night in full capacity
which is called "organized crime industry". This has made even the perspective of geostrategic
assessment to undergo a major shift. Balkan strategic importance now is not seen neither in natural
advantages nor in the military advantages, but in the risks that it can export to. Among them, the
phenomenon of organized crime is seen as one of the main risks.
For this reason the struggle against it is composed from one of the main directions of international
contribution to the strengthening of institutions in the region, but at the same time one of the basic
conditions to be met by the governments of these countries to realize the aspiration of integration into
the EU and NATO. An assessment of threats and risks from organized crime in Southeastern European
countries remains danger and major obstacle to progress, particularly for Kosovo.
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Also according to expert evaluation, organized crime is included among the three main types of threats
of our time in the field of public order and safety and its direct impact in the rule of law. Organized
crime is also seen as a source of direct feed to these threats, whether it is regional, ethnic conflicts or
terrorism. As an illegal activity based on illegal profit, organized crime threatens the stability of the
rule of law and threatens and challenges legal and economic foundations of the state. Organized crime,
with its focus on economic and financial crime, has become today the highest growing trend
component in the world, with a global profit estimated about 1.8 trillion USD per year. While in
Southeastern European countries are thousands of companies and banks that are managed by
organized crime groups. Balkan countries, except Croatia, loose about 20 - 30% of annual revenue
from organized crime. This empowerment of criminal groups and organized crime is dangerous
because they constitute a threat against the state, peace and the tendency of finding a potential partner
to international terrorism.

2. Background of organized crime in Kosovo
In the last century there were forms of organized crime in the Balkans and in Kosovo. Naturally the
question arises how it was possible that within 14 years it was developed at a dizzying speed, so much
as it could compete even with the most notorious mafia? The given answers are different, but in
particular the analysis and evaluation experts refer to the following factors:
Prolonged transition: With the end of the Cold War, occurred total destruction of social structures and
law enforcement, which resulted in a chaotic situation very favorable for the emergence and fast
flourishing of phenomena and structures of organized crime.
Lack of tradition and experience in democracy. The Balkans in the 1990s was like Europe in the
1950s, but with the difference that here lacked political traditions and cultural foundations to build a
stable democracy.
Economic development. The privatization of public assets and the transition to a free market economy
was accompanied by abusive practices, greater unemployment and extreme poverty. The creation of
a European single market brought reduced trade barriers, at the same time for the exercise of unlawful
activities.
Smuggling of people. During the 1990s, Balkan countries and Kosovo in particular, were introduced
to the migration of larger scale since the years 1955-1966. During the transition, only from Kosovo
emigrated approximately 30% of the total population, or 45% of the workforce. Today there are about
700,000 immigrants, mainly in Germany (250,000), in Switzerland (150,000), in UK 50,000, about
50,000 in Scandinavian countries, in Benelux countries around 50000, around 50000 in Austria, in
Italy more than 20 000, in Slovenia and Croatia above 20000 and in other states of the EU and in the
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. West was not prepared to understand how far can reach
the adventure of people deprived of freedom for a long time, with unmet vital needs, remained within
the limits of a dream and a hope.
The geographical position. Geographically, Balkans has been a corridor connecting three continents:
Europe, Asia and Africa, and historically has been a increasingly troubled boundary between freedom
and oppression, backwardness and development, welfare and poverty. Kosovo is considered a
quadrilateral relationship between Belgrade-Thessaloniki and Sofia-Rome.
The advantage of action. Another reason why organized crime has progressed rapidly in our country
is the advantage of action to benefit from newly created situation, while the strategies and cooperation
among institutions within the state has its difficulties. What it is worth noting is that regional
cooperation between law enforcement agencies is extremely slow indicator, but with signs of
optimism based on funding and projects of regional mechanisms to improve the existing situation.

Definition
The UN Convention of 2000 defined it as "a structured group of three or more persons acting in
collaboration, to provide, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit".
Key feature of organized crime is illegal acquirement of financial gain, without hesitation to use any
illegal action. The drive for profit is the basic reason that dictates the decisions and actions of the
greater number of criminal organizations today. Other features are the organization, discipline and
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loyalty among members of the organization, corruption of officials and governors, respect for
hierarchy, and the diversity of criminal activities. Organizational survival is also another significant
feature of organized crime groups. Ties between members, who are often relatives or the same blood,
are created such that all collisions that may endure an individual, organization should succeed and
continue the activity.
Participation or organization of organized criminal group under the legislation of the Republic of
Kosovo27
1.
Whoever, with the intent and with knowledge of either the aim and general activity of the
organized criminal group or its intention to commit one or more criminal offenses which are
punishable by imprisonment of at least four (4) years, actively takes part in the group’s criminal
activities knowing that such participation will contribute to the achievement of the group’s criminal
activities, shall be punished by a fine of up to two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) EUR and
imprisonment of at least seven (7) y ears.
2.
Whoever organizes, establishes, supervises, manages or directs the activities of an organized
criminal group shall be punished by a fine of up to five hundred thousand (500,000) EUR and by
imprisonment of at least ten (10) years.
3.
When the activities of the organized criminal group provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of this
Article result in death, the perpetrator shall be punished by a fine of up to five hundred thousand
(500,000) EUR and by imprisonment of at least ten (10) years or lifelong imprisonment.
4.
The court may reduce the punishment of a member of an organized criminal group who, before
the organized criminal group has committed a criminal offense reports to the police or prosecutor the
existence, formation and information of the organized criminal group in sufficient detail to allow the
arrest or the prosecution of such group.
5.
For the purposes of Article, “actively takes part” includes, but is not limited to, the provision
of information or material means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of financing of the
group’s activities.
Experts describe organized crime groups from Kosovo with the following features:

Homogeneous, ready to get in touch and cooperate with other criminal organizations and to
open new areas of crime.

Specialized in drug trafficking, human trafficking and people smuggling.

Less sophisticated, less cautious, but with a tendency to use violence and willing to use
firearms to overcome the obstacles that come along criminal activities.

Organizations do not claim to be alone in the territory in which they operate. With the principle
that "there is room for everyone," operating several organization in a territory, with mutual
respect, avoiding collision.

They do not have vertical structure or a managing dome, but they operate "each on its own".

The members of criminal groups often change their boss, passing from one group to another.

In the West, in many cases, are organized on the basis of the towns they come from.

In aspect of money circulation, it is generally preferred "cash" and not through banking
channels.

Although during telephone conversations are used nicknames, they are not so cautious and
often this was the cause of their discovery.

3. Types of organized crime in Kosovo.
Criminal organizations cannot give up from goal of quick profits and dominance in economic and
public life. They are involved in many areas of criminal activity ranging from drug trafficking, human
trafficking, goods trafficking (weapons, stolen cars, cigarettes, etc.), as well as other activities of
financial crimes, such as fraud, counterfeiting of coins and money laundering.
Drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking. For criminal groups in Kosovo this field is a
"paradise" for criminal profits, phenomena that undermine society and rattle political , economic and
27

M ore specifically, the provisions of the Criminal Code, Chapter XXIV, Organized crime, Article
283
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social stability in Kosovo. Besides weak structures and the lack of experience of state bodies and law
enforcement agencies, Kosovo was affected by this phenomenon because of the geographical
position, as the main thoroughfare, linking drug manufacturers in the East with its customers in the
West without excluding the impact of migration of the Kosovo citizens. Recently, special place has
the activity of people smuggling directly affected by the so-called "Arab spring" especially with the
Syrian conflict where criminal groups are finding themselves in cooperation throughout the region
dividing spheres of geostrategic interest 28.
In concept of drug and human trafficking, besides illegal immigration, exploitation for profit is also
included, mostly of women and children29. According to a UN report in April 2006, this phenomenon
has affected almost every country of the world. There were identified 127 countries of origin and 137
countries of destination. Kosovo is ranked as the country of origin and destination with high human
trafficking, but also as a transit country. Victims are mostly women, girls and children, "tool" of
prostitution and trafficking industry.
In the Balkans, an entire criminal infrastructure has been established and functioning, that is in control
of the whole process of human trafficking, in chain system, from recruitment countries, to a certain
place30.
Albanian criminal groups are quite advanced in this field and have built networks across Western
Europe. Albanian traffickers are known to use violence and talent to deceive their victims, by
including for this purpose the female associate or even offering fake marriages. M oney laundering is
the basic mechanism of recycling all kinds of organized crime. Essentially, the aim is to disguise the
criminal nature of profits and to increase revenue to fund criminal activities in new areas. Like the
laundries of Al Capone era, any criminal gang has a legitimate business as a facade. Organized crime
bosses cannot resist the temptation to make a luxurious life, to demonstrate the power and occupy key
positions in the social hierarchy.
Quote from a report of WSJ journalist: When you are in the center of the Pristina, you find it difficult
to believe that you are in the poorest country of Europe. On one hand frowning faces, stress and
poverty and in the other hand you see luxury shops and villas and teens that drive expensive BM Ws
and M ercedes. This ostentatious wealth comes from organized crime.
It is considered that informal economy is flourishing in Kosovo, especially in the northern part where
criminal groups have exploited political problems and the lack of rule of law to turn that area into
oasis and refuge for criminal groups with little or almost no banking activity and all criminal activity
is considered to have the nature of money laundering.
Financial crime and money laundering are often the main tools of corruption, in public institutions as
well as in private activity.
When criminal profit manages to gain the status of a pure benefit, not does this only cover a committed
crime, but also opens the way for a new crime. When criminals appear as gentlemen with white collars
and with the help of money aim for position in the top of the social hierarchy, the normal course of
development of a society is severely distorted and the social equilibrium is shaken. Another even
greater risk is that sophisticated financial crimes and money laundering poses tendency to be used
more and more to finance terrorism.
Because money laundering is one of the basic links to organized crime recycling, for state bodies of
law enforcement, the fight against this phenomenon is one of the key points to win the battle, which
begins with a simple question at the bank counter or in the form of property declaration: "Sir, where
is this money earned?"
This battle has already started but I think it will be painful and with the consequences for society of
Kosovo.
28

It is deemed that by buying one gram of heroin in Afghanistan for 1 USD and by selling it for 100
USD in Western Europe, Balkan drug cartels earn a mind blowing profit, which experts estimate to
be around $2.5 billion a year.
29
After drug industry, the second largest industry in the world is prostitution, with a global annual
profit of around $7-10 billion.
30
Figures show that out of 700,000 of annual trafficking victims in the world, 200,000 are transported
from the Balkans. 70% of women working in the so-called massage center, and 80% of London's
prostitutes are from the Balkans and Baltic countries. Profit of gangs from this traffic reaches 950
million euro. According to press information, only one bar in M acedonia that deals with trafficking
of girls wins between 1000 to 15,000 euro in a single night.
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4. Application of covert and technical measures of investigation
A major change in the Code of Criminal Procedure has come late in the legislative process at the
request of European Union experts for data protection. Articles 84-100 regulate the use of covert and
technical measures of investigation. They can be applied before or after authorization of criminal
investigations, whether the name of the suspect is known or not. However, in order to meet European
Union standards, all should be based on a court order. Therefore, pursuant to Article 91 these intrusive
measures include:
• Covert observation with photography or video;
• Covert monitoring of conversations in public places;
• Control of mail shipments;
• Undercover investigation:
• Recording of phone calls;
• Photo or video observation in private places;
• Covert monitoring of conversations in private places;
• Interception of telecommunications: including text messages and other electronic messages;
• Interception of communications via computer network;
• Controlled delivery of mail shipments;
• The use of tools for monitoring the whereabouts;
• Simulated purchase of an item;
• Simulation of corruption offense; and
• Disclosure of financial data.
European Union practices allow the prosecutor to issue a temporary order for any of these measures
until the court confirms the order within a reasonably short time. Therefore, in Article 91 (1), the state
prosecutor may issue temporary orders only in emergency cases when delays would jeopardize the
investigation or the safety and life of the victim, witness, informant or their family members. There
is a lower standard for investigations of money laundering or offenses under Chapter XXIV
(Organized crime) or Chapter XXXIV (Corruption) of the Criminal Code. When these criminal acts
are committed, the state prosecutor may issue a temporary order "in necessary cases" where the delay
could harm the investigation or the life and safety of the victim, witness, informant or their family
member. In such cases, the disclosure of financial data, for example, may require quick orders for
many banks with the purpose of searching or freezing of assets. The court may confirm the interim
order within three days to determine the legality of his writing, ex officio. Under Article 92 (1) (3),
the order must be supported by the sound probability, while in the previous Code of Criminal
Procedure, intrusive measures could be supported with suspicion.
This leaves unanswered the question of whether the evidence would to be acceptable, if they were
collected by a provisional order of the prosecutor, but not confirmed by the court. Article 97 (1) clearly
states that the evidence is taken through such measures would be unacceptable if the order or its
implementation have been unlawful. Under Article 97 (3), defense attorney can challenge the
acceptability of those evidences after the indictment and the single judge court or the presiding judge
of the case will decide on the exclusion or not of those proofs.
Another major change is in Article 96. Earlier, someone who is mistakenly made the subject of covert
measures could require correction of that action before the District Court.
M easures for the protection of data require a greater extent of notification prescribed in Article 96 (4).
If there was executed a secret or technical measure, more people should be notified: the person who
is the target, the other persons who are greatly affected and private persons and facilities that are
affected. Notice to persons who are targeted and to the affected persons, should be done much earlier
than in the previous code. According to Article 96 (5), the notification should take place as soon as
without endangering the purpose of the investigation, the life, physical integrity and personal liberty
of another or significant assets. Those persons may challenge the order for covert and technical
measures at the basic court and may appeal the court's decision to the Appeal Court.
These measures for data protection are not optional. Under Article 96 (2), only after the affected
parties have received notice of covert measures under Article 96 (5) the decisions and documents
relating to these measures can be added to the case file. This raises concerns regarding the use and
admissibility of documents arising from these covert and technical measures. Can they be used to
seek court orders or to be used during the investigation, or is this limitation narrower? Also, it can be
read in the literature regarding the prevention of use of evidence resulting from application of covert
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measures to support an indictment until notification of affected parties. It is also not clear how this
will work with an ongoing investigation if a person has been willing to plead guilty and cooperate.
Practitioners should take into account the definitions in article 19. M ost investigative actions should
be based on reasonable suspicion, grounded cause of sound probability. These are expressions of the
previous code of criminal procedure, but which are defined in the new code. To meet the reasonable
suspicion, for example, Article 19 (8) states that the prosecutor must have "knowledge of information
that would convince an objective observer that a criminal offence has occurred is occurring or there
is a substantial likelihood that one will occur and the person concerned is substantially likely to have
committed the offence".
Practitioners should take into account the definitions in article 19. M ost investigative actions should
be based on reasonable suspicion, grounded cause of sound probability. These are expressions of the
previous code of criminal procedure, but which are defined in the new code. To meet the reasonable
suspicion, for example, Article 19 (8) states that the prosecutor must have "knowledge of information
that would convince an objective observer that a criminal act has occurred, is occurring or is highly
likely to occur and that the person concerned may commit or may have committed the offense".
Standard of "objective observer" requires the prosecutor not to see whether he or she is self-convinced,
but whether most people would be convinced from that information. It also does not require
possession of admissible evidence, but only the prosecutor to have knowledge of the information.
Definitions for grounded suspicion and grounded cause require from the prosecutor to possess
"articulable evidence", which means that he or she should be able to describe the supporting evidence
for grounded suspicion or grounded cause. These three standards - reasonable doubt, grounded
suspicion and grounded cause - do not require that from prosecutor to have evidence that is admissible,
but only that he or she has supporting information or evidence.
On the other hand the standard of "sound probability" is higher and is defined in article 19 (1) (11).
This is standard to justify intrusion in the privacy of the person, such as medical check or examination,
and does not require the prosecutor to have admissible evidence. Also, Article 19 (1) (12) defines
"well-grounded suspicion," that is standard for filing an indictment by the prosecutor. This requires
the prosecutor to possess "admissible evidence that would convince an objective observer that an
offense has occurred and that it is committed by the defendant."
For example, the prosecutor issued a provisional order for interception of telephone messages. One
of messages says that drugs will be sold in a bar in city of Gjilan in a week. After three days, the court
refuses to confirm the provisional order issued by the prosecutor and does confirm the order ex officio
as a lawful order. If the prosecutor asked the court issuing the order to simulate drug purchase at the
bar in Gjilan, demand will be based on evidence that were not admissible (the telephone message).
Under Article 19 (1) (11), it would not be a sufficient basis for "sound probability" but it would be
sufficient for grounded suspicion. However, under Article 92 (1) (3), an order for covert and technical
measures should be based on sound probability, that means that the prosecutor should have admissible
evidence. Therefore, the court should not accept the request for simulated purchase unless the
prosecutor possesses other admissible evidence supporting that claim.

5. Investigation phase
If during the initial stages it becomes clear that the offense has occurred and the perpetrator is
identified, or that there is a need for covert and technical measures of investigation, in that case the
state prosecutor will take over the above investigations. Articles 73-83 require from the police, public
entities or individuals to present criminal charges to the state prosecut or, who either dismisses them,
requires more information, or begins a criminal investigation. Articles 84-100 regulate the appliance
of covert and technical measures of investigation, which can be applied before or after the formal
authorization of criminal investigations.
If the state prosecutor initially has sufficient evidence by the police, the injured party or any other
source, article 101 allows him to immediately file the indictment. The standard for indictment is that
the state prosecutor has evidence to support the well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense
occurred. This standard is set out in Article 101 (2) and Article 240. The defendant can challenge an
indictment under Article 250 if it is not based on well-grounded suspicion. Therefore, if there is
reasonable suspicion only for the criminal offense but still insufficient for an indictment, the state
prosecutor can initiate investigation phase, in accordance with Articles 102-104. At any stage, the
20
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defendant may plead guilty in accordance with Article 233. State Prosecutor shall decide to initiate
the investigation in accordance with Article 103. He/she can still issue order or require from the court
to issue order for covert and technical measures of investigation pursuant to Articles 84-100, even
after the initiation of investigations. The decision must be issued by the appropriate court, and may
include a request for a search warrant under Article 105, or for asset seizure pursuant to Chapter
XVIII. The prosecutor may also issue a decision to freeze assets pursuant to Chapter XVII.

Conclusions
Organized crime is a primary problem in the Republic of Kosovo and constitutes a serious impediment
to national security. Its negative impact is felt in all fields: political, economic, social and
technological.
1.
Politically, organized crime groups can manipulate the political system trying to "buy" power,
as in the executive power structures as well as those of law enforcement. This results in disrespect of
laws accepted in democratic systems, the lack of stability in the country and the loss of people's
confidence in state institutions.
2.
In the economic field, organized crime brings degradation of systems and legal practices of
businesses. By creating income from money laundered by organized crime groups and their assets in
legitimate business market, the legitimate business is compromised severely.
3.
The fear that organized crime brings to people is the first and the heaviest impact from the
social point of view. Fear leads to lack of trust in the political system and law enforcement.
4.
Prospects and challenges: Success in the fight against organized crime is achieved: by
improving relevant legislation; rise the number and strengthen the structures that are involved in the
fight against organized crime (personnel and their professional skills); by strengthening cooperation
with internal and external agencies, institutions and other organizations of law enforcement and, by
increasing the level of public awareness.
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